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Abstract11
1 Device-to-Device (D2D) communication is expected to be a key feature sup-
ported by 5G networks, especially due to the proliferation of Mobile Edge Com-
puting (MEC), which has a prominent role in reducing network stress by shifting
computational tasks from the Internet to the mobile edge. Apart from being part
of MEC, D2D can extend cellular coverage allowing users to communicate di-
rectly when telecommunication infrastructure is highly congested or absent. This
significant departure from the typical cellular paradigm imposes the need for de-
centralised network routing protocols. Moreover, enhanced capabilities of mobile
devices and D2D networking will likely result in proliferation of new malware
types and epidemics. Although the literature is rich in terms of D2D routing
protocols that enhance quality-of-service and energy consumption, they provide
only basic security support, e.g., in the form of encryption. Routing decisions can,
however, contribute to collaborative detection of mobile malware by leveraging
different kinds of anti-malware software installed on mobile devices. Benefiting
from the cooperative nature of D2D communications, devices can rely on each
other’s contributions to detect malware. The impact of our work is geared to-
wards having more malware-free D2D networks. To achieve this, we designed and
implemented a novel routing protocol for D2D communications that optimises
routing decisions for explicitly improving malware detection. The protocol iden-
tifies optimal network paths, in terms of malware mitigation and energy spent
for malware detection, based on a game theoretic model. Diverse capabilities of
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network devices running different types of anti-malware software and their po-
tential for inspecting messages relayed towards an intended destination device
are leveraged using game theoretic tools. An optimality analysis of both Nash
and Stackelberg security games is undertaken, including both zero and non-zero
sum variants, and the Defender’s equilibrium strategies. By undertaking net-
work simulations, theoretical results obtained are illustrated through randomly
generated network scenarios showing how our protocol outperforms conventional
routing protocols, in terms of expected payoff, which consists of: security damage
inflicted by malware and malware detection cost.
Keywords: Device-to-Device (D2D) communications, iRouting protocol,12
Malware detection games, Game theory.13
1. Introduction14
Demand for anytime-anywhere wireless broadband connectivity and increas-15
ingly stringent Quality of Service (QoS) requirements pose new research chal-16
lenges. As mobile devices are capable of communicating in both cellular (e.g. 4G)17
and unlicensed (e.g. IEEE 802.11) spectrum, the Device-to-Device (D2D) net-18
working paradigm has the potential to bring several immediate gains. Network-19
ing based on D2D communication [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] not only facilitates wireless and20
mobile peer-to-peer services, but also provides energy efficient communications,21
locally oﬄoading computation, oﬄoading connectivity, and high throughput. The22
most emerging feature of D2D is the establishment and use of multi-hop paths to23
enable communications among non-neighbouring devices. In multi-hop D2D com-24
munications, data are delivered from a source to a destination via intermediate25
(i.e. relaying) devices, independently of operators’ networks.26
1.1. Motivation27
To motivate the D2D communication paradigm, we emphasise the need for28
localised applications. These run in a collaborative manner by groups of devices29
at a location where telecommunications infrastructures: (i) are not present at30
all, e.g. underground stations, airplanes, cruise ships, parts of a motorway, and31
mountains; (ii) have collapsed due to physical damage to the base stations or32
insufficient available power, e.g. areas affected by a disaster such as earthquake;33
or (iii) are over congested due to an extremely crowded network, e.g. for events34
in stadiums, and public celebrations. Furthermore, relay by device can be lever-35
aged for commercial purposes such as advertisements and voucher distributions36
for instance in large shopping centres. This is considered a more efficient way of37
promoting businesses than other traditional methods such as email broadcast-38
ing and SMS messaging due to the immediate identification of the clients in a39
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surrounding area. Home automation and building security are another two areas40
that multi-hop data delivery using D2D communications is likely to overtake our41
daily life in the near future while multi-hop D2D could be also leveraged towards42
the provision of anonymity against cellular operators [6].43
A key question related to multi-hop D2D networks is, which route should the44
originator of some data choose to send it to an intended destination?. This has45
been exhaustively investigated in the literature of wireless and mobile ad hoc46
routing with well-known protocol to be among others AODV [7], DSR [8], and47
OLSR [9]. A thorough survey of standardisation efforts in this field has been48
published by Ramrekha et al. [10].49
Due to the myriad number of areas D2D communications are applicable to,50
devices are likely to be an ideal target for attackers who aim to infect devices51
with malware. Authors in [11] point out that malware in current smartphones52
and tablets have recently rocketed and established its presence through advanced53
techniques that bypass security mechanisms of devices. Malware can spread, for54
instance, through a Multimedia Messaging System (MMS) with infected attach-55
ments, or an infected message received via Bluetooth aiming at stealing users’ per-56
sonal data or credit stored in the device. An example of a well-known worm that57
propagates through Bluetooth was Cabir, which consists of a message containing58
an application file called caribe.sis. Apart from malware infection, Khuzani et59
al. [12] have investigated outbreaks of malware (i.e. malware epidemics) mainly60
by adopting the notion of D2D communication. Finally, social engineering at-61
tacks against mobile phones is one of the most serious threats, as presented in a62
relevant survey here [13]. For thorough surveys on mobile malware one may refer63
to [11, 14].64
1.2. Innovation65
In a nutshell,this paper presents a novel routing protocol, for D2D commu-66
nications, that supports malware detection in an optimal way by using non-67
cooperative game theoretic tools, which have been extensively used in the secu-68
rity literature (e.g. [15]) and in D2D routing (e.g. [16]). Game theory has also69
been used for other than routing purposes [17], [18, 19] in D2D networks. In this70
paper we only focus on security games and we tackle a decision-making routing71
challenge, in D2D networks, in presence of an adversary who injects malware72
into the network, after she has compromised a gateway that connects the D2D73
network with the cloud. This assumption is fairly realistic given the vast power74
attackers have in their hands these days to successfully exploit vulnerabilities of75
modern gateways. Our underlying network has been inspired by the Mobile Edge76
Computing (MEC) (also refer to as Fog Computing) paradigm as a step towards77
addressing security within the realm of an increasingly important area of 5G.78
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Our protocol, called iRouting (abbreviating “intelligent Routing”), is de-79
signed upon the theoretical analysis of a simple yet illuminating two-player se-80
curity game between the Defender, which abstracts a D2D network, and the81
Attacker, which abstracts any adversarial entity that wishes to inject malware82
into the D2D network. We have proven that the Defender’s equilibrium strategies83
leave the network better off, in terms of expected payoff, which is a combination84
of security damage and malware detection cost (i.e. cycles process units). Note85
that iRouting can work on top of underlying physical and MAC layer protocols86
[20, 21].87
It is worth noting that this paper does not tackle secure routing issues in88
traditional ways. For a survey of secure routing protocols for wireless ad hoc89
networks, see [22, 23]. Such protocols mainly aim at enabling confidentiality,90
and integrity of the communicated data and they do not consider underlying91
collaborative malware detection.92
1.3. Progress beyond relevant work93
This paper extends, in a significant manner, the results initially presented in94
[24]. The exact differences are summarized below.95
• [24] assumes a pure device-to-device network while in this paper the device-96
to-device network has been enriched with a part of mobile edge comput-97
ing. The network devices request services from the MEC server and multi-98
hopping enables communication between the MEC server and the different99
devices to overcome proximity issues due to the latter being outside the100
transmission range of the server. In this paper, the security challenge is101
how to safely utilise MEC services where a cluster-head (i.e. MEC server)102
might be compromised by an adversary. Although this does not introduce103
any new challenge in terms of malware detection and routing, it is an as-104
sumption that places the idea of the paper within mobile edge computing105
and 5G architectures.106
• This paper assumes different mobile operating systems and these can be107
infected with different types of malware as opposed to [24], which goes as108
far as considering just a set of malicious messages that are sent from the109
attacker’s device to infect the legitimate devices. This also has the effect of110
defining, in this paper, the Malware Detection Game whereas in [24], the111
defined game is called Secure Message Delivery Game.112
• In [24], a confusion matrix is defined to determine how the different devices113
of the network can detect malicious messages. In this paper here we take114
a more realistic, in the terms of cyber security, approach where for each115
device there is a probability to be compromised by malware. Therefore,116
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each route has, in turn, a penetration level, which is the probability the117
route to be compromised due to one or more devices on it being vulnerable.118
• In [24], the details about the interdependencies of malicious message de-119
tectors is not discussed, while in our paper here we explicitly say that120
each control detects different signs of malware and no interdependencies, in121
terms of detection capabilities, are assumed, i.e. we have assumed that an122
anti-malware control is the minimal piece of software that detects certain123
malicious signs.124
• In [24], the Attacker is not assumed to monitor the network before launching125
a malware attack (no reconnaissance) while in our paper here the Attacker126
surveils the network before injecting malware giving us a Stackelberg game127
to study.128
• In [24], only Nash Equilibria (NE) and maximin strategies have been stud-129
ied. On the other hand, our paper here derives Strong Stackelberg Equi-130
libria (SSE) and shows the relationship among three of them; SSE, NE131
and maximin. Not only that, but this paper exhibits much larger depth of132
mathematical analysis referring also to best responses of players. Finally,133
it proves the equality of strategies of different games, such zero-sum and134
non-zero sum across all strategic types (Nash, Stackelberg, maximin).135
• Although Panaousis et al. [24] has investigated both zero sum and non-zero136
sum games, where in the latter the utility of the Attacker is a positive affine137
transformation (PAT) of the defender’s utility, in this paper we go beyond138
that. We show the equality of the different strategies holds in a more generic139
(i.e. than the PAT case) payoff structure where the Attackers utility is a140
strictly positive scaling of the Defender’s utility.141
• All simulations in [24] were numeric; as well as they do not compare the142
performance of the proposed routing protocol with other device-to-device143
routing protocols. For the purposes of our paper here we have undertaking144
a network simulation to compare the proposed protocol with legacy routing145
protocols using the OMNeT++ network simulator. In this way we have146
simulated physical and link-layer network characteristics.147
• In our paper here, we have considered, in our simulations, the efficacies of148
some of the most-recent real-world anti-malware controls against real-world149
malware types as opposed to the purely numeric assignment to the different150
variables.151
• In our simulations here, we have included a new Attacker type, called152
Weighted, which allows the adversary to distribute her resources propor-153
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tionally, over the different routes, aiming at the highest expected dam-154
age. This type of Attacker was not simulated in [24].155
1.4. Main assumptions156
Our analysis assumes that each device has some malware detection capabili-157
ties (e.g. anti-malware software). Therefore, a device is able to detect malicious158
application-level events. In other words, each device has its own detection rate159
which contributes towards the overall detection rate of the routes that this de-160
vice is part of. In order to increase malware detection, the route with the highest161
detection capabilities must be selected to relay the message to the destination.162
However, due to the different malware types available to attackers, these days,163
such a decision is not trivial. One could argue that if we know the probability164
of a malware type to be chosen, we can develop a proportional routing strategy,165
which will distribute security risks across the different routes by choosing routes166
in a proportional, to their malware detection capabilities, manner. Since this167
knowledge can not be taken for granted in addition to the volatile nature of168
such statistics, in this paper we use game theory to optimise routing decisions to169
support malware detection in D2D networks, regardless of the probability of the170
different malware to be used by the Attacker.171
1.5. Outline172
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we review173
related work with more emphasis to be given in papers at the intersection of game174
theory, security, and routing for wireless ad hoc networks (i.e. prominent example175
of D2D networking). In Section 3, we present the system and game models, while176
in Section 4, we devise game solutions. In Section 5, we undertake optimality177
analysis which leads to a list of theoretic contributions. Section 6 describes, in178
detail, the iRouting protocol, and in Section 7, we compare iRouting against179
other routing protocols. Finally, Section 8 provides concluding remarks and points180
towards future research.181
2. Related work182
In this section, we briefly review the state-of-the-art, in chronological or-183
der, in terms of game theoretic approaches at the intersection of three fields:184
security, routing, and device-to-device networks. Another set of game theoretic185
works that focus on optimising intrusion detection strategies per se than adjust-186
ing routing decisions to optimally support intrusion detection, consist of papers187
such as [25], [26], [27], [27], [28], [29], [30], and [31]. Our work is complementary188
to this literature as it optimises end-to-end path selections, in terms of malware189
detection efficacy and computational effort.190
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Looking more into decision regarding packet forwarding by using game theo-191
retic tools and without incentive mechanisms in place, Felegyhazi et al. [32] have192
studied the Nash equilibria of packet forwarding strategies with tit-for-tat punish-193
ment strategy in an iterative game. In each stage (i.e. time slot) of the game, each194
device selects its cooperation level based on the normalised throughput it experi-195
enced in the previous stage. As opposed to iRouting, the authors do not propose196
a new end-to-end routing protocol; instead they consider a shortest path algo-197
rithm. Also, they assume the existence of internal malicious or selfish nodes in198
contrast to our work here, which models an adversary outside of the D2D clus-199
ter, who aims to infect legitimate devices with malware.200
In a more security-oriented vein, Yu et al. [33] have used game theory to study201
the dynamic interactions, in mobile ad hoc (device-to-device) networks, between202
“good” nodes, which initially believe that all other nodes are not malicious, and203
“adversaries”, which are aware of which nodes are good. They propose secure204
routing and packet forwarding games that consist of 3 stages: route participa-205
tion; route selection; and packet forwarding. In the first stage, a node decides206
whether to be part of route or not; in the second phase, a node who wishes to207
send a packet to a destination, after it discovers a valid route (called when all208
nodes agree to be part of it), it either uses the discovered route or not; and, fi-209
nally, in the third phase, each relay node decides to forward or not an incoming210
packet. They have derived optimal defence strategies and studied the maximum211
potential damage, which incurs when attackers find a route with maximum num-212
ber of hops and they inject malicious traffic into it. The same authors also com-213
bined this game with a secure routing game but without considering noise and214
imperfect monitoring. Yu et al. [34] extended [33] and proposed a secure cooper-215
ation game under noise and imperfect monitoring. Likewise, Yu and Liu tackled216
the same challenge and presented a richer set of performance evaluation results in217
[35]. The above publications do not tackle the same challenge with iRouting, as218
they do not investigate the selection of a route among an available set of routes219
to deliver packets from a source to a destination220
Finally, in [36], Panaousis and Politis present a routing protocol that respects221
the energy spent by intrusion detection on each route and therefore prolonging222
network lifetime. This paper takes a simple approach, according to which the223
attacker either attacks or not a route, and the Defender, likewise, decides whether224
to allocate resources to defend or not.225
None of the aforesaid protocols consider the propagation of malware within226
the network and none of these works investigates Stackelberg games, which ba-227
sically assume that the Attacker conducts surveillance before deciding upon her228
strategy. This is a reasonably realistic assumption when looking at the intelli-229
gence of cyber hackers and it is a conventional decision in other security related230
fields [37, 38, 39, 40].231
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3. System description and game model232
This section presents our underlying system model along with its compo-233
nents. Mobile-edge computing (MEC) is an emerging paradigm that allows mobile234
applications to oﬄoad computationally intensive workloads to a MEC server. This235
introduces a new network architecture concept that provides cloud-computing ca-236
pabilities at the edge of the mobile network. The MEC server is likely to be setup237
by a service provider to ensure that it can provide a service environment with238
very low latency and high-bandwidth.239
3.1. System description240
We use a motivational paradigm demonstrating how D2D communication can241
be combined with a MEC architecture [41], as depicted in Fig. 1. In our model,242
MEC is an intermediate layer between a D2D cluster and the cloud, aiming at243
low-latency service delivery from the latter to the former, and it can serve users244
by using local short-distance high-rate connections. The intermediate layer can245
contain a number of deployed MEC servers aiming to handle the localised requests246
issued by cluster users.247
We assume that devices within a cluster can communicate in a D2D manner:248
directly or by using multi-hop routes. The cluster is formed based on discovery249
protocols that run in each device. These allow to sense the environment and250
create a list of one-hop neighbours in order to be able to communicate should251
any request to forward data or a direct request be sent. We also assume no cellular252
infrastructure within the cluster, which means that devices can only communicate253
in a device-to-device fashion.254
It is envisaged that such scenarios will be very common in 5G ecosystems255
where heterogeneous wireless technologies (e.g. NB-LTE, WiFi, ZigBee, Blue-256
tooth) will facilitate D2D communication [3]. For example, a device that seeks257
some data, can request this from other devices in its cluster, and if the Request258
cannot be served the MEC servers must be contacted to assist with the discovery259
of this data.260
The idea here is that a MEC server is dedicated to provide predefined service261
applications to cluster users without the need to communicate with the cloud262
so that it accelerates responses while “pushing” the cloud away of the user. We263
assume that each D2D cluster has a cluster-head [42], which is a device that264
communicates with the MEC servers. The main functionalities of a cluster-head265
are (i) to forward the Request of a device to the MEC servers, and (ii) upon266
its response, to transmit the Reply back to the requestor. In this work, the267
cluster-head can be any device of the cluster. The MEC server is expected to268
talk to both the cloud servers and the cluster-head to handle functionalities such269
as device identifier allocation, call establishment, UE capability tracking, service270
support, and mobility tracking. Note that the election of the cluster-head is not271
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investigated in this paper and also this paper is not concerned about deciding272
the nature of the cluster-head.273
3.2. Adversarial model274
As any open wireless environment, akin to one described in this paper, can275
be a target of adversaries. More specifically, in this paper, we assume the exis-276
tence of a malicious device, called the Attacker, that can launch a Man-In-the-277
Middle (MITM) attack by hijacking the link between the cluster-head and MEC278
servers. Our analysis adopts the Dolev-Yao model [43]. According to this, the279
D2D network, along with its established connection with the MEC servers, is280
represented as a set of abstract entities that exchange messages. Yet, the adver-281
sary is capable of overhearing, intercepting, and synthesising any message and282
she is only limited by the constraints of the deployed cryptographic methods. We283
enrich this adversarial model by considering “compromised MEC servers”. This is284
to say that the adversary per se could be inside a legitimate MEC server interact-285
ing with the cluster-head by using valid credentials and having privileged access286
to MEC servers. In this way, the adversary can inject a fake Reply, crafted with287
malware, and send it back to the data requestor aiming at infecting her device.288
3.3. Malware detection289
In this adversarial environment, we envisage the use of anti-malware controls290
running in each device. These can be responsible for scanning network traffic for291
patterns to detect known malicious attempts. Each device may even respond to292
newly detected attack methods (anomaly-based detection). Upon detection, de-293
vices can block messages that are likely to consist of insecure content preventing,294
in this way, the spread of malware to other devices within their cluster. This as-295
sumption can be seen as an advanced application of the next-generation firewalls296
to mobile devices. Although in this paper we assume that any detected malice is297
blocked by the device that has successfully undertaken the inspection, our work298
can be extended to support collaborative (e.g. reputation-based) filtering towards299
blocking messages that end up having a bad reputation. Such an approach can300
take advantage of learning techniques and its investigation will be part of our301
future work.302
3.4. Formulation303
Let us assume a cluster of N devices. We denote by C its cluster-head, and by304
Rqs the requestor of some data. Henceforth we will refer to this data as D. If the305
latter can not be found within the cluster itself, Rqs must seek D hosted by the306
MEC servers of its cluster. Thus, C receives a Request from Rqs, and it then307
queries the MEC server.308
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Figure 1: Investigated system model, where a device requests data, that the cluster devices do
not possess, from the MEC server. The adversary has successfully launched a MITM attack
controlling the communication between cluster-head and MEC server.
When C receives back a Reply from the MEC server and Rqs is not within309
its transmission range, a route r must be established to deliver D from C to310
Rqs. Therefore, there is a need for the devices to relay D towards Rqs, but before311
that, C must decide upon r. We assume R routes available between C and Rqs,312
we denote by rj ∈ [R], the jth route, and the set of devices that constitute rj313
are expressed by Sj . Note that we use the notation [Ξ] to represent the set of Ξ314
elements.315
Although the route selection can be entirely taken based on quality-of-service316
parameters optimising network delay and jitter, the presence of an Attacker, let317
it be A, introduces uncertainty with regards to the malice of the data conveyed318
toward Rqs. For instance, if A controls the link C ⇐⇒ MEC, then D can be319
anything including malware. If this is the case, Rqs, which trusts C, is very likely320
to be infected by this malware. In this paper, the infection risk depends on the321
likelihood the malware to be collaboratively detected prior to the data being used322
by Rqs. This detection relies on devices that forward packets to Rqs, as these are323
also inspecting the incoming and outgoing network traffic.324
Let us consider Λ different mobile operating systems, and Mλ different mal-325
ware available to the Attacker to infect devices that run a mobile operating system326
λ ∈ [Λ]. Each device may run one or more anti-malware controls and for each λ327
we assume AMλ anti-malware controls, which can mitigate malware that targets328
devices running λ.329
Let us also assume S devices and a device si ∈ [S], which runs λ, might
have available a combination of anti-malware controls given by the set [AM iλ] ⊆
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[AMλ]. We use the characteristic function
2 1[AM iλ]
: [AMλ] → {0, 1} defined as
follows:
1[AMλ](az) :=
{
1, if az ∈ [AMλ],
0, if az /∈ [AMλ].
(1)
to express whether a control az is installed in si or not.330
We express by d(ml, az) ∈ [0, 1) the effectiveness of anti-malware control az
in mitigating ml ∈ [Mλ]. As a device can run one or more anti-malware controls,
and each control az has 1 − d(ml, az) probability of failing to detect ml, the
probability of si failing to detect ml equals
p(si,ml) :=
∏
az∈[AMλ]:1[AMλ](az)=1
[1− d(ml, az)] . (2)
Note that each control detects different signs of malware and no interdependen-331
cies, in terms of detection capabilities, are assumed in this paper. To put it332
differently, we have assumed that an anti-malware control is the minimal piece333
of software that detects certain malicious signs.334
We define as335
p(si) := [p(si,ml)]ml∈[Mλ] ∈ [0, 1]Mλ . (3)
the vector of failing detection probabilities, which captures the effectiveness of si336
on detecting malware of the set [Mλ]. One challenge here is to be able to derive337
these probabilities in practice. This, for instance, can be done by undertaking338
thorough penetration tests (i.e. ethical hacking) to assess the efficacy of each339
anti-malware control. These tests can be performed oﬄine for individual software340
components and then their combinations can be deployed on the devices. As a341
result of this we can derive the probability of ml to infect Rqs, when C uses the342
jth route for data delivery, as follows:343
p(rj ,ml) :=
∏
si∈Sj
p(si,ml). (4)
Thus, we define as p(rj) := [p(rj ,ml)]ml∈[M ] the vector of probabilities rj to be344
infected by the different malware. For more convenience, Table 1 summarizes the345
notation used in this paper.346
2this is a function defined on a set X that indicates membership of an element in a subset
X ′ of X, having the value 1 for all elements of X ′ and the value 0 for all elements of X not in
X ′.
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Table 1: List of Symbols
Symbol Description Symbol Description
[N ] Set of N devices C Cluster-head
Rqs Data requestor D Requested data
[R] Set of routes from C to Rqs rj j-th route
Sj Set of devices on rj A Attacker
[Λ] Set of mobile operating systems λ Operating system
[Mλ] Set of malware that can infect λ [AMλ]
Set of anti-malware controls for
λ
[S] Set of devices si i-th device
ml l-th malware d(ml, az)
Effectiveness az in mitigating
ml
p(si,ml)
Probability of si failing to de-
tect ml
p(si)
Vector of “failing-to-detect”
probabilities of si for different
malware
p(rj ,ml)
Probability of Rqs to be infected
with malware ml when D is sent
over rj
p(rj)
Vector of infection probabilities
for rj and all malware types
[M ] Set of malware ρ Defender’s mixed strategy
µ Attacker’s mixed strategy S(rj ,ml)
Expected security damage on
route rj when relaying ml
c(si) Malware detection cost on si C(rj) Malware detection cost on rj
H(ml) Security loss inflicted by ml L path length
Cj Set of computational malware
inspection costs c(si) in rj
Tj Set of malware inspection capa-
bilities p(si) in rj
3.5. Game model347
Now that we have defined our system model by describing its components and348
their relationship, in the rest of this section, we use game theory to investigate349
the optimal strategic routing decisions of C, the Defender, and the Attacker who350
aims to infect one of the cluster devices with mobile malware. The Attacker’s351
objective is to succeed an attack against Rqs and the Defender must select a352
route to deliver the Reply to Rqs.353
We define the Malware Detection Game (MDG) between Defender and At-354
tacker, as an one-shot, bimatrix game of complete information played for each355
requestor that seek some data. The set of pure strategies of the Defender consists356
of all possible routes, rj ∈ [R], from C to Rqs. On the other hand, the pure strate-357
gies of the Attacker are the different malware ml ∈ [M ] that can be injected into358
the D2D network in the form of a Reply. Thus, in MDG a pure strategy profile359
is a pair of Defender and Attacker actions, (rj ,ml) ∈ [R] × [M ] giving a pure360
strategy space of size R×M . For the rest of the paper, the convention is adopted361
where the Defender is the row player and the Attacker is the column player.362
Each player’s preferences are specified by her payoff function, and we define363
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as Ud : (rj ,ml)→ R− and Ua : (rj ,ml)→ R+ the payoff functions of the Defender364
and Attacker, respectively, when the pure strategy profile (rj ,ml) is played. Ac-365
cording to [44], we define a preference relation %, when ml is chosen by the366
Attacker, by the condition rx % ry, if and only if Ud(rx,ml) ≥ Ud(ry,ml). In gen-367
eral, given the set [R] of all available routes from C to Rqs, a rational Defender can368
choose a route (i.e. pure strategy) r∗ that is feasible, that is r∗ ∈ [R], and optimal369
in the sense that r∗ % r, ∀ r ∈ [R], r 6= r∗; alternatively she solves the problem370
maxr∈[R] Ud(r, ml), for a message ml ∈ [M ]. Likewise, we can define the prefer-371
ence relation for the Attacker, where mx % my ⇐⇒ Ua(rj ,mx) ≥ Ua(rj ,my), for372
a route rj ∈ [R].373
MDG can be seen as a game per session, where the start of each session is374
signified by the transmission of a new Reply that the cluster-head will send to375
Rqs; it is also realistic to assume that over a time period, there will be multi-376
ple sessions. To derive optimal strategies for the Defender during the repetitions377
of MDGs, we deploy the notion of mixed strategies. Since players act indepen-378
dently, we can enlarge their strategy spaces, so as to allow them to base their379
decisions on the outcome of random events that create uncertainty to the op-380
ponent about individual strategic choices maximising their payoffs. Hence, both381
Defender and Attacker deploy randomised (i.e. mixed) strategies. The mixed382
strategy ρ of the Defender is a probability distribution over the different routes383
(i.e. pure strategies) from C to Rqs, where ρ(rj) is the probability of delivering384
a Reply via rj under mixed strategy ρ. We refer to a mixed strategy of the385
Defender as a Randomised Delivery Plan (RDP). For the finite nonempty set386
[R], let Π[R] represent the set of all probability distributions over it, i.e.387
Π[R] := {ρ ∈ R+R|
∑
rj∈[R]
ρ(rj) = 1}. (5)
Therefore a member of Π[R] is a mixed strategy of the Defender.388
Likewise, the Attacker’s mixed strategy is a probability distribution over the389
different available malware. This is denoted by µ, where µ(ml) is the probability390
of choosing ml under mixed strategy µ. We refer to a mixed strategy of the391
Attacker as the Malware Plan (MP). Similarly with (5), we express by Π[M ] the392
set of all probability distributions over the set of all Attacker’s pure strategies393
given by [M ]. Thus, a member of Π[M ] is as a mixed strategy of the Attacker. From394
the above, the set of mixed strategy profiles of MDG is the Cartesian product of395
the individual mixed strategy sets, Π[R] ×Π[M ].396
Definition 1. The support of RDP ρ is the set of routes {rj |ρ(rj) > 0}, and it397
is denoted by supp(ρ).398
Definition 2. The support of MP µ is the set of malware {ml|µ(ml) > 0}, and399
it is denoted by supp(µ).400
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The above definitions state that the subset of routes (resp. malware) that401
are assigned positive probability by the mixed strategy ρ (resp. µ) is called the402
support of ρ (resp. µ). Note that a pure strategy is a special case of a mixed403
strategy, in which the support is a single action.404
Now that we have defined the mixed strategies of the players, we can define405
MDG as the finite strategic game Γ = 〈(Defender, Attacker), Π[R]×Π[M ], (Ud, Ua)〉.406
For a given mixed strategy profile (ρ,µ) ∈ Π[R]×Π[M ], we denote by Ud(ρ,µ), and407
Ua(ρ,µ) the expected payoff values of the Defender and Attacker, where the ex-408
pectation is due to the independent randomisations according to mixed strategies409
ρ, and µ.410
Formally411
Ud(ρ,µ) :=
∑
rj∈[R]
∑
ml∈[M ]
Ud(rj ,ml)ρ(rj)µ(ml). (6)
and similarly412
Ua(ρ,µ) :=
∑
rj∈[R]
∑
ml∈[M ]
Ua(rj ,ml)ρ(rj)µ(ml). (7)
By using the preference relation we can say that, for an Attacker’s mixed413
strategy µ, the Defender prefers to follow the RDP ρ as opposed to ρ′ (i.e. ρ %414
ρ′), if and only if Ud(ρ,µ) ≥ Ud(ρ′,µ).415
Definition 3. The Defender’s (resp. Attacker’s) best response to the mixed strat-416
egy µ (resp. ρ) of the Attacker (resp. Defender) is a RDP ρBR ∈ Π[R] (resp. µBR ∈417
Π[M ]) such that Ud(ρ
BR,µ) ≥ Ud(ρ,µ), ∀ ρ ∈ Π[R] (resp. Ua(ρ,µBR) ≥ Ud(ρ,µ), ∀ µ ∈418
Π[M ]).419
It is noteworthy to mention that the game theoretic solutions that we will420
propose, in the next section, involve randomisation. For instance, in a mixed equi-421
librium, each player’s randomisation leaves the other indifferent across her ran-422
domisation support. These choices can be deliberately randomised or be taken by423
software agents that run in mobile devices (i.e. cluster-heads or adversaries). How-424
ever these are not the only equilibria interpretations. For instance, the probabil-425
ities over the pure actions (i.e. route or malware pure selections) can represent426
(i) time averages of an “adaptive” player, (ii) a vector of fractions of a “popula-427
tion”, where each player type adopts pure strategies and, (iii) a “belief” vector428
that each player has about the other regarding their behaviour.429
4. Game solutions430
Now that we have defined MDG along with its components, in this section we431
concentrate in deriving optimal strategies for the Defender. First, we investigate432
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the problem of determining best RDPs and MPs (i.e. mixed strategies), for the433
Defender and the Attacker respectively, when both parties are rational decision-434
makers and they play simultaneously. Note that a game solution is a prediction435
of how rational players may take decisions.436
As we have not explicitly defined the strategic type of Attacker, we consider437
different types of solutions based on various Attacker behaviours. This analysis438
will allow us to draw robust conclusions regarding the overall optimal Defender439
strategy, which will minimise expected damages regardless of the Attacker type.440
4.1. Nash mixed strategies441
The most commonly used solution concept in game theory is that of Nash442
Equilibrium (NE). This concept captures a steady state of the play of the MDG443
in which Defender and Attacker hold the correct expectation about the other444
players’ behaviour and they act rationally. In other words, an NE dictates optimal445
responses to each other’s actions, keeping the others’ strategies fixed, i.e. strategy446
profiles that are resistant against unilateral deviations of players.447
Definition 4. In any Malware Detection Game (MDG), a mixed strategy profile448
(ρNE,µNE) of Γ is a mixed NE if and only if449
1. ρNE % ρ, ∀ρ ∈ Π[R], when the Attacker chooses µNE, i.e.450
Ud(ρ
NE,µNE) ≥∀ρ∈Π[R] Ud(ρ,µNE); (8)
2. µNE % µ, ∀µ ∈ Π[M ], when the Defender chooses ρNE, i.e.451
Ua(ρ
NE,µNE) ≥∀µ∈Π[M ] Ua(ρNE,µ). (9)
Definition 5. The Nash Delivery Plan (NDP), denoted by ρNE, is the probability452
distribution over the different routes, as determined by the NE of the MDG.453
For instance, a NDP (0.7, 0.3) dictates that 70% of the Replys will be sent454
over r1, and 30% over r2. Note that this distribution does not determine which455
Reply is sent over which route, as this decision is probabilistic.456
4.2. Maximin strategies457
We say that the Defender maximinimizes if she chooses an RDP that is best458
for her on the assumption that whatever she does, the Attacker will choose an459
MP to cause the highest possible damage to her.460
Definition 6. A Randomised Delivery Plan ρ† ∈ Π[R] is a maximin strategy of461
the Defender, if and only if462
min
µ∈Π[M ]
Ud(ρ
†,µ) ≥ min
µ∈Π[M ]
Ud(ρ,µ), ∀ρ ∈ Π[R]. (10)
15
Table 2: A toy game example
m m′
r -3,1 -1,0
r′ -4,0 -2,1
A maximinimiser for the Defender is an RDP that maximises the payoff that463
the Defender can guarantee. In other words, ρ† guarantees (i.e. “secures”) the464
Defender at least her maximin payoff regardless of µ, as ρ† solves the problem465
maxρ minµ Ud(ρ,µ). That is why ρ
† is also called security strategy.466
Definition 7. A Malware Plan µ† ∈ Π[M ] is a maximin strategy of the At-467
tacker, if and only if468
min
ρ∈Π[R]
Ua(ρ,µ
†) ≥ min
ρ∈Π[R]
Ua(ρ,µ), ∀µ ∈ Π[M ]. (11)
4.3. Stackelberg mixed strategies469
A two-player Stackelberg game involves one player (leader) to commit to a470
strategy before the other player (follower) moves. In a Stackelberg model the471
commitment of the leader is absolute, that is the leader cannot back-track on her472
commitment. On the other hand, the follower sees the strategy that the leader473
committed to, before she chooses a strategy.474
In an Stackelberg MDG, the Attacker conducts surveillance before she attacks475
and therefore she is aware of the Defender’s RDP. For completeness, we consider476
that this best-response is expressed also in mixed strategies.477
In general, Stackelberg and Nash games do not have the same equilibria. For478
instance, let us consider the normal-form MDG in Table 2, where the Defender has479
only two routes (r, r′) available and the Attacker can choose between two malware480
types (m,m′). We see that if this is a Nash game, r is a strictly dominant strategy481
for the Defender, as it gives her a higher payoff value than r′. As we have assumed482
that this is a complete information game, the Attacker knows that r is preferable483
for the Defender and she chooses m, which rewards her with 1 as opposed to484
m′, which gives payoff value 0. Therefore the NE of the game (in pure strategies)485
is (r,m).486
If we now consider this game as Stackelberg, the Defender (leader) can commit487
to a strategy before the Attacker (follower) chooses her strategy. If the Defender488
commits to r then the Attacker will play m, but if the Defender commits to r′489
then the Attacker will choose m′. The second pure strategy profile, i.e. (r′,m′)490
gives higher payoff to the Defender (-2 as opposed to (r,m), which gives -3) and491
therefore the Defender is better-off in the Stackelberg game compared to the Nash492
game, where her payoff equals -3 < -2.493
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Definition 8. A Reply Delivery Plan (RDP) is optimal if it maximises the De-494
fender’s payoff given that the Attacker will always play a best-response strategy495
with tie-breaking in favour of the Defender.496
Definition 9. A Malware Plan is a best response if it maximises the Attacker’s497
payoff, taking the Defender’s Reply Delivery Plan as given.498
A commonly used notion of a solution in Stackelberg games is the Strong499
Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE), defined in MDG as follows.500
Definition 10. At the Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium of the MDG:501
1. for any ρ ∈ ∆[R], the Attacker plays a best-response µBR(ρ) ∈ ∆[M ] that502
is,503
Ua(ρ,µ
BR(ρ))≥Ua(ρ,µ(ρ)), ∀µ(ρ)6=µBR(ρ); (12)
2. for any ρ ∈ ∆[R], the Attacker breaks ties in favour of the Defender, that504
is, when there are multiple best responses to ρ, the Attacker plays the best505
response µSSE(ρ) ∈ ∆[M ] that maximises the Defender’s payoff:506
Ud(ρ,µ
SSE(ρ))≥Ud(ρ,µBR(ρ)),
∀µBR best response to ρ; (13)
3. the Defender plays a best-response ρSSE ∈ ∆[R], which maximises her payoff507
given that the Attacker’s strategies are given by the first two conditions508
(i.e. the Attacker always plays best response with tie-breaking in favour of509
the Defender [38],[45]):510
Ud(ρ
SSE,µSSE(ρSSE))≥Ud(ρ, µSSE(ρ)), ∀ ρ6=ρSSE. (14)
5. Optimality analysis511
For the purpose of analysis, we consider complete information Nash MDGs,512
according to which both players know the game matrix, which contains the util-513
ities of both players for each pure strategy profile. The utility function of the514
Defender is determined by the probability of failing to detect a route and the515
overall performance cost, which is imposed on the devices of the j-th route when516
undertaking malware detection. We denote by c(si) the performance cost imposed517
on each si ∈ Sj and therefore the overall performance cost over a route rj equals518 ∑
si∈Sj c(si).519
We consider two different MDGs; (i) a zero sum MDG, where the Attacker’s520
utility is the opposite of the Defender’s utility and (ii) a non-zero sum MDG,521
where the Attacker’s utility is a strictly positive scaling of the Defender’s utility.522
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The rationale behind the zero sum game is that when there are clear winners523
(e.g. the Attacker) and losers (e.g. the Defender), and the Defender is uncertain524
about the Attacker type, she considers the worst case scenario, which can be525
formulated by a zero sum game where the Attacker can cause her maximum526
damage. While in most security situations the interests of the players are neither527
in strong conflict nor in complete identity, the zero sum game provides important528
insights into the notion of “optimal play”, which is closely related to the minimax529
theorem [46].530
In the zero sum MDG, Γ0 = 〈{d, a}, [R] × [M ], {Ud,−Ud}〉 (for clarity d has531
been used for the Defender and a for the Attacker), the Attacker’s gain is equal to532
the Defender’s security loss, and vice versa. We define the utility of the Defender533
in Γ0 as534
UΓ0d (rj ,ml) := −wH p(rj ,ml)H(ml)− wC
∑
si∈Sj
c(si). (15)
The first term of (15) is the expected security loss of the Defender inflicted by the535
Attacker when attempting to infect Rqs with ml, while the second term expresses536
the aggregated message inspection cost imposed on all devices of rj , irrespective537
of the attacking strategy. Note that wH , wC ∈ [0, 1] are importance weights, which538
can facilitate the Defender with setting her preferences in terms of security loss,539
and computational detection cost, accordingly.540
By setting S(rj ,ml) = wH p(rj ,ml)H(ml), and C(rj) = wC
∑
si∈Sj c(si), we541
have that542
UΓ0d (rj ,ml) := −S(rj ,ml)− C(rj). (16)
For a mixed profile (ρ,µ), the utility of the Defender equals543
UΓ0d (ρ,µ)
(6)
=
∑
rj∈[R]
∑
ml∈[M ]
UΓ0d (rj ,ml)ρ(rj)µ(ml)
(16)
=
∑
rj∈[R]
∑
ml∈[M ]
[−S(rj ,ml)− C(rj)]ρ(rj)µ(ml)
= −
∑
rj∈[R]
∑
ml∈[M ]
S(rj ,ml)ρ(rj)µ(ml)
−
∑
rj∈[R]
C(rj)ρ(rj).
(17)
As Γ0 is a zero sum game, the Attacker’s utility is given by U
Γ0
a (ρ,µ) =544
−UΓ0d (ρ,µ). Since the Defender’s equilibrium strategies maximise her utility,545
given that the Attacker maximises her own utility, we will refer to them as optimal546
strategies.547
As Γ0 is a two-person zero sum game with finite number of actions for both548
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players, according to Nash [47], it admits at least a NE in mixed strategies, and549
saddle-points correspond to Nash equilibria as discussed in [15] (p. 42). The fol-550
lowing result from [48], establishes the existence of a saddle (equilibrium) solution551
in the games we examine and summarizes their properties.552
Definition 11 (Saddle point of the MDG). The Γ0 Malware Detection Game553
(MDG) admits a saddle point in mixed strategies, (ρNEΓ0 ,µ
NE
Γ0
), with the property554
that555
• ρNEΓ0 = arg maxρ∈∆[R] minµ∈∆[M ] UΓ0d (ρ,µ), ∀µ, and556
• µNEΓ0 = arg maxµ∈∆[M ] minρ∈∆[R] UΓ0a (ρ,µ), ∀ρ.557
Then, due to the zero sum nature of the game, the minimax theorem [46] holds,558
i.e. maxρ∈∆[R] minµ∈∆[M ] U
Γ0
d (ρ,µ) = minµ∈∆[M ] maxρ∈∆[R] U
Γ0
d (ρ,µ).559
The pair of saddle point strategies (ρNEΓ0 ,µ
NE
Γ0
) are at the same time security560
strategies for the players, i.e. they ensure a minimum performance regardless of561
the actions of the other. Furthermore, if the game admits multiple saddle points562
(and strategies), they have the ordered interchangeability property, i.e. the player563
achieves the same performance level independent from the other player’s choice564
of saddle point strategy.565
The minimax theorem [46] states that for zero sum games, NE and minimax566
solutions coincide. Therefore, ρNEΓ0 = arg minρ∈∆[R] maxµ∈∆[M ] U
Γ0
a (ρ,µ). This567
means that regardless of the strategy the Attacker chooses, the Nash Delivery568
Plan (NDP) is the Defender’s security strategy that guarantees a minimum per-569
formance.570
We can convert Γ0 into a Linear Programming (LP) problem and make use of571
some of the powerful algorithms available for LP to derive the equilibrium. For a572
given mixed strategy ρ of the Defender, we assume that the Attacker can cause573
maximum damage to Rqs by injecting a message m̂ into the cluster network.574
Formally, the Defender seeks to solve the following LP:575
max
ρ∈∆[R]
min
µ∈∆[M]
UΓ0d (ρ, m̂ )
subject to

UΓ0d (ρ,m1)−minµ∈∆[M] UΓ0d (ρ, m̂)e ≥ 0
...
UΓ0d (ρ,mM )−minµ∈∆[M] UΓ0d (ρ, m̂)e ≥ 0
ρe = 1
ρ ≥ 0.
(18)
In this problem, e is a vector of ones of size M .576
Lemma 1. A mixed strategy profile (ρNE,µNE) ∈ Π[R] ×Π[M ] in Γ0, is a mixed577
strategy NE if and only if578
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1. every route rj ∈ supp(ρNE) selection is a best response to µNE and,579
2. every malware ml ∈ supp(µNE) selection is a best response to ρNE.580
Proof. First, notice that Ud, as defined in (15), is a linear function in ρ(rj) that581
is, for any two RDPs ρ1 and ρ2 and any number θ ∈ [0, 1] we have Ud(θ ρ1 + (1−582
θ)µ) = θ Ud(ρ1) + (1 − θ)Ud(ρ2). Then, for the sake of contradiction, assume583
there exists a route r′j ∈ supp(ρNE) selection that is not a best response to584
µNE. Due to the linearity of Ud in ρ
NE(rj), the Defender can increase her payoff585
by transferring probability from ρ(r′j) to a route selection that is a best response586
to µNE, creating a new mixed strategy ρ∗ % ρNE. However, this contradicts the587
assumption that ρNE is the strategy of the Defender at the NE, as the Defender588
prefers to deviate from ρNE to gain a higher payoff, by playing ρ∗. The second589
part of the lemma can be proven in the same way.590
Let us now assume a non-zero sum MDG, denoted by Γ, with the same591
strategy spaces with Γ0, in which the Defender’s utility is the same as in Γ0,592
i.e. UΓd (ρ,µ) = U
Γ0
d (ρ,µ) = −S(rj ,ml) − C(rj). On the other hand, the At-593
tacker’s utility is (strictly positive) scaling of the security loss S(rj ,ml) of the594
Defender upon a successful attack. This is to say that the performance cost of595
the Defender is only important to her as the Attacker is only after compromising596
Rqs. Therefore, given a pure strategy profile (rj ,ml), the utility of the Attacker,597
in Γ, is defined as:598
UΓa (rj ,ml) := ΞS(rj ,ml), for Ξ > 0. (19)
For a mixed profile (ρ,µ) the utility of the Attacker is given by599
UΓa (ρ,µ)
(7)
=
∑
rj∈[R]
∑
ml∈[M ]
UΓa (rj ,ml)ρ(rj)µ(ml)
(19)
=
∑
rj∈[R]
∑
ml∈[M ]
ΞS(rj ,ml)ρ(rj)µ(ml).
(20)
Hence, due to UΓd (ρ,µ) = U
Γ0
d (ρ,µ), from (17) and (20) we have that600
UΓd (ρ,µ) = −
1
Ξ
UΓa (ρ,µ)−
∑
rj∈[R]
C(rj)ρ(rj)
= − 1
Ξ
UΓa (ρ,µ)− k(ρ),
(21)
where 1Ξ > 0, and k(ρ) is an expression that does not depend on µ. That is, the601
best response of the Defender to any given malware plan, also yields the utility602
for the Defender at the worst case scenario.603
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Lemma 2. NE strategies of the Defender in Γ are equivalent of the NE strategies604
of the Defender in Γ0. Formally, Ω
NE
Γ = Ω
NE
Γ0
.605
Proof. By definition, a strategy profile (ρNE,µNE) is NE of Γ if and only if:
S(ρNE,µNE) + k(ρNE) ≤ S(ρ,µNE) + k(ρ),∀ρ ∈ ∆[R], (22a)
Ξ · S(ρNE,µNE) ≥ Ξ · S(ρNE,µ),∀µ ∈ ∆[M ]. (22b)
Here is the observation:606
Ξ · S(ρNE,µNE) ≥ Ξ · S(ρNE,µ),∀µ ∈ ∆[M ] ⇐⇒
Ξ · [S(ρNE,µNE) + k(ρNE)] ≥
Ξ · [S(ρNE,µ) + k(ρNE)], ∀µ ∈ ∆[M ].
(23)
Since Ξ > 0, the latter condition is satisfied if and only if:607
S(ρNE,µNE) + k(ρNE) ≥ S(ρNE,µ) + k(ρNE),∀µ ∈ ∆[M ]. (24)
In short, (ρNE,µNE) is a NE of Γ, if and only if it satisfies:
S(ρNE,µNE)+k(ρNE)≤S(ρ,µNE)+k(ρ),∀ρ∈∆[R], (25a)
S(ρNE,µNE)+k(ρNE)≥S(ρNE,µ)+k(ρNE),∀µ∈∆[M ]. (25b)
But these are exactly the conditions describing a NE of Γ0. Therefore Ω
NE
Γ =608
ΩNEΓ0 .609
Lemma 3. In Γ, the set of NE and Maximin strategies of the Defender are610
equivalent, i.e. ΩNEΓ = Ω
maximin
Γ .611
Proof. (⇒) Since Γ0 is a two person zero-sum game, we know that the set of NE612
and Maximin strategies of the Defender are the same, i.e. ΩNEΓ0 = Ω
maximin
Γ0
. Let613
(ρNE,µNE) ∈ ΩNEΓ then based on Lemma 2 we have that (ρNE,µNE) ∈ ΩNEΓ0 . Since614
Γ0 is zero-sum, ρ
NE ∈ ΩmaximinΓ0 . But the strategy spaces and the utility of the De-615
fender are the same in both Γ and Γ0. Hence the conditions for a mixed strategy to616
be a Defender’s Maximin is the same in both games. Therefore, ρNE ∈ ΩmaximinΓ ,617
i.e. ΩNEΓ ⊆ ΩmaximinΓ .618
(⇐) The argument goes in the other direction as well: consider ρNE ∈ ΩmaximinΓ . Since619
the utility of the Defender and the strategy spaces are the same across the two620
games, for the same strategy ρNE, we have that ρNE ∈ ΩmaximinΓ0 . Since Γ0 is two-621
player zero-sum, there exists µNE such that (ρNE,µNE) ∈ ΩNEΓ0 . From Lemma 2,622
this means (ρNE,µNE)Γ ∈ ΩNE. Hence, Maximin strategies of the Defender are623
also part of her NE strategies in Γ, i.e. ΩmaximinΓ ⊆ ΩNEΓ . Putting the two together624
ΩNEΓ = Ω
maximin
Γ .625
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This lemma establishes that the Defender can randomise according to her NE626
and, in expectation, be guaranteed at least the expected utility prescribed by627
the NE, irrespective of the mixed strategy of the Attacker. To put it differently,628
the Defender can play her pessimistic maximin strategy, but she does not lose629
anything in expectation by not playing a NE strategy. It is worth stressing that630
this property only holds for the NE strategy of the Defender and not of the631
Attacker.632
Lemma 4. In Γ, the set of Maximin and SSE strategies of the Defender are the633
same, i.e. ΩmaximinΓ = Ω
SSE
Γ .634
Proof. (⇒) Let ρNE ∈ ΩSSEΓ be a SSE strategy of the Defender. Then by defini-635
tion, ρNE is (i) an optimal strategy of the Defender given that (ii) the Attacker636
is best-responding to it but by (iii) breaking ties in favour of the Defender. That637
is:638
(i) ρNE ∈ arg maxρ∈∆[R] Ud(ρ,µBR(ρ)) where;639
(ii) for any ρ ∈ ∆[R], µBR(ρ) ∈ arg maxµ∈∆[M ] Ua(ρ,µ) and;640
(iii) for any ρ ∈ ∆[R]:641
µBR(ρ) ∈ arg max
µ∈arg maxµ∈∆[M] Ua(ρ,µ)
Ud(ρ,µ). (26)
Let us examine condition (ii): for any ρ ∈ ∆[R]:642
µBR(ρ) ∈ arg max
µ∈∆[M]
Ξ · S(ρ,µ) ⇐⇒
µBR(ρ) ∈ arg max
µ∈∆[M]
Ξ · [S(ρ,µ) + k(ρ)]
µBR(ρ) ∈ arg max
µ∈∆[M]
S(ρ,µ) + k(ρ).
(27)
In short, condition (ii) is equivalent to:
(iv) For any ρ ∈ ∆[R],µBR(ρ) ∈ arg min
µ∈∆[M ]
Ud(ρ,µ).
This makes condition (iii) irrelevant. But conditions (i) and (iv) exactly describe643
a Maximin strategy of the Defender. Therefore we have proved that ΩSSEΓ ⊆644
ΩmaximinΓ . (⇐) The argument can be established identically in reverse direction,645
starting from a Maximin strategy of the Defender. So given conditions (i) and646
(iv) we must prove that conditions (ii) and (iii) are true. Let ρNE ∈ ΩmaximinΓ be647
a Maximin strategy of the Defender. Then by definition, ρNE is (i) an optimal648
strategy of the Defender given that (iv) the Attacker is minimising Defender’s649
utility. We see that condition (ii) is true if and only if condition (iv) is true. Since650
the Maximin strategy ρNE makes condition (iv) true, it will also make condition651
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(ii). To prove that ρNE is an SSE, we also need to prove condition (iii). Let us652
assume that the condition is not true. This means that there is a best-response653
of the Attacker that does not break ties in favour of the Defender. Formally,654
µBR(ρ)/∈arg max
µ∈argmaxµUa(ρ,µ)
Ud(ρ,µ)⇐⇒
µBR(ρ)/∈arg max
µ∈argmaxµUa(ρ,µ)
{−S(ρ,µ)−k(ρ)}⇐⇒
µBR(ρ)/∈arg min
µ∈argmaxµUa(ρ,µ)
{
S(ρ,µ)+k(ρ)
}⇐⇒
µBR(ρ)/∈arg min
µ∈argmaxµUa(ρ,µ)
S(ρ,µ)⇐⇒
µBR(ρ)/∈arg min
µ∈argmaxµUa(ρ,µ)
Ua(ρ,µ),
(28)
which is leads to a contradiction. Therefore condition (3) holds, and putting655
together all three conditions (1), (2), and (3), we have that ρNE, which is a656
Maximin strategy of the Defender it is also an SSE strategy, i.e. ΩmaximinΓ ⊆657
ΩSSEΓ . Putting the two proofs together we have that Ω
maximin
Γ = Ω
SSE
Γ .658
Theorem 1. In Γ, the set of NE, Maximin and SSE strategies of the Defender659
are the same, i.e. ΩNEΓ = Ω
maximin
Γ = Ω
SSE
Γ . Besides, all NE are interchangeable,660
in Γ, and all yield the same utility for the defender.661
Proof. Trivially, from Lemmas 3 and 4 we have that ΩNEΓ = Ω
maximin
Γ = Ω
SSE
Γ . Since662
Γ0 is a two person zero-sum game, we know that all NE are interchangeable663
[48]. From Lemma 2 the NE of Γ0 are the NE of Γ and vice-versa. We also see664
that the utility of the Defender is the same across Γ and Γ0. Therefore the utility665
of the Defender in all NE of our original game is the same, which also implies666
that all NE of our original game are interchangeable.667
The above lemma establishes that the Defender, regardless of whether the At-668
tacker conducts surveillance, she plays optimally when she randomises according669
to her NE strategy.670
Theorem 2. Regardless of the type of malware detection game played, i.e.671
1. a zero sum or a non-zero sum malware detection game,672
2. a Nash or a Stackelberg malware detection game,673
the Defender plays optimally by choosing any strategy ρ ∈ ΩNEΓ0 .674
Proof. By combining 2 and 1, we have that ΩNEΓ0 = Ω
NE
Γ = Ω
maximin
Γ = Ω
SSE
Γ ,675
which proves the theorem.676
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The above theorem demonstrates that it is computationally efficient for the677
Defender to derive her optimal strategy by solving the LP represented by (18). It678
is worth noting that a similar result but for different problem has been published679
in [37].680
6. iRouting681
In this section, we present the iRouting protocol, which stands for intelligent682
Routing and whose routing decisions are made according to the Nash Delivery683
Plan (NDP). iRouting has been designed based on the mathematical findings684
of the MDG analysis, presented in previous sections, and its main goal is to685
maximise the utility of the Defender in the presence of a “rational” Attacker.686
Within the realm of Mobile Edge Computing (MEC), devices of the cluster687
request services from the cluster-head (denoted by C) imposing the need for estab-688
lishing an end-to-end path between the requestor (i.e. destination device denoted689
by Rqs) and C. Each time data must be delivered to Rqs, C has to compute the690
NDP by solving an MDG for this destination. To do this, following the route691
discovery, C uses its latest information about the malware detection capabilities692
of all possible routes to Rqs, along with their inspection costs (i.e. malware detec-693
tion costs to perform, for example, intrusion classification). Data is then relayed694
and collaboratively inspected by the devices on its way to Rqs. Overall, the ob-695
jective of C (i.e. the Defender) is to select the route that can correctly detect696
and filter out malicious data before they infect Rqs by making sure that it is not697
crafted with malware. We assume that each device must use its data inspection698
capabilities at the maximum possible degree..699
iRouting has characteristics of reactive route selection protocols, meaning that700
it takes action and starts computing routing paths that have not been previously701
computed when a request for data delivery to Rqs is issued. iRouting requires to702
obtain information about the malware inspection capabilities and the associated703
computational cost of devices, in routes from C to Rqs.704
iRouting consists of three main phases, which we describe in more detail705
in the remainder of this section. In the first phase of the protocol (described in706
Algorithm 1), C broadcasts a Route REQuest (RREQRqs) to discover routes towards707
Rqs. Each device that receives the RREQRqs), acts similarly by broadcasting it708
towards Rqs. After C sends a RREQRqs, it has to await for some timeout Treq,709
which is set equal to the Net Traversal Time (NetTT), as in AODV [7].710
The second phase of the protocol starts when the receiving device is Rqs. Then,711
this device does not forward the request any further. Instead, it prepares a Route712
REPly (RREPRqs), and sends it back towards C by using the reverse route, which is713
built during the delivery of RREQRqs, as described by Algorithm 2. Each RREPRqs714
carries information about: (i) the set Sj of devices that comprise a route; (ii)715
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Algorithm 1 Seeking routes to destination Rqs.
1: procedure iRouting Request(s, Rqs,Sj)
2: s seeks routes to Rqs by broadcasting RREQRqs;
3: if a device si receives RREQRqs then
4: Sj ∪ {si};
5: if si 6= Rqs then
6: si executes iRouting Request(si, Rqs,Sj);
7: else
8: L← |Sj |, n← 0, Tj ← ∅, Cj ← ∅;
9: iRouting Response(n,L, Tj , Cj ,Sj , Rqs);
10: break;
11: end if
12: end if
13: end procedure
Algorithm 2 Responding to a cluster-head with a route to Rqs.
1: procedure iRouting Response(n,L, Tj , Cj ,Sj , s)
2: s sends RREPRqs to the (L− n)-th device of Sj , let it be si;
3: if si 6= C then
4: Tj ∪ p(si), Cj ∪ c(si), n← n+ 1;
5: iRouting Response(n,L, Tj , Cj ,Sj , si);
6: else
7: Execute iRouting(Rqs, D,Sj, Tj, Cj);
8: break;
9: end if
10: end procedure
the set Tj of vectors of “failing-to-detect” probabilities, for different malware,716
of devices in rj ; and (iii) the set Cj of computational malware inspection costs717
c(si) of devices in rj . These values are updated while the RREPRqs is traveling718
back to C. When each device (e.g. si) that is involved in the route response719
phase, receives the RREPRqs, it updates Tj and Cj . Within the time period Treq, C720
aggregates RREPRqs messages and updates its routing table with information that721
can be used to derive the optimal routing strategy, as dictated by Theorem 2.722
In the third phase of the protocol, described in Algorithm 3, C uses its routing723
table to solve the MDG by computing the Nash Delivery Plan, denoted by ρNE,724
which has a lifetime T . Then, C probabilistically selects a route according to ρNE725
to deliver the requested data to Rqs. The chosen route is denoted by r∗. Note726
that for the same Rqs and before T expires, C uses the same ρNE to derive r∗,727
upon a new Request.728
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Algorithm 3 Delivering data to Rqs.
1: procedure iRouting(Rqs, D,Sj, Tj, Cj)
2: C derives the Nash Delivery Plan, ρNE using Sj , Tj , Cj ;
3: C chooses r∗ probabilistically as dictated by ρNE;
4: C delivers D to Rqs over r∗;
5: Each device si ∈ r∗ performs data inspection;
6: if D found to carry malware then
7: si drops D;
8: si notifies C by sending a notification message along the reverse path;
9: C blacklists the device that sent, through the cloud, D consisting of
malware;
10: else
11: si forwards D to Rqs;
12: end if
13: end procedure
Also, the third phase focuses on detecting malware injected along with the729
requested data (denoted by D) to prevent the infection of Rqs. While D is delivered730
to Rqs over r∗, the relay devices, on r∗, perform data inspection auditing D for731
malware. Upon successful detection, the device that detects the malware, first732
drops D, and then notifies C that D was crafted with malware. The notification733
message is sent along the reverse path. When receiving this, C blacklists the734
device that has originally sent D (this device is assumed that has hijacked the735
communication link between MEC server and the cluster-head). This can be seen736
as the first step towards mitigating the investigated attack model and anything737
beyond that is out of the scope of this paper.738
While each data D is collaboratively inspected by the devices on its way to Rqs,739
the derivation of the optimal routing strategy, i.e. the Nash Delivery Plan (NDP),740
is computed only by C through solving a Malware Detection Game (MDG) for741
this specific destination Rqs. Therefore, even if the other devices are aware of the742
existence of some infected data, it is only C that isolates the Attacker (i.e. data743
source) towards mitigating future malware infection risks.744
The communications complexity of the iRouting protocol measured in terms745
of number of messages exchanged in performing route discovery is O(2N), where746
N is the number of devices in the D2D network. As a reactive routing protocol,747
iRouting has higher storage complexity than conventional routing protocols, but748
it supports multiple-path routing and QoS routing making malware detection749
optimal, as shown in section 5. Finally, iRouting has a time complexity equal to750
O(2D), where D is the diameter of the D2D network.751
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Table 3: Simulation parameter values
Parameter Value
Number of nodes 20
Mobility model Linear Mobility
Mobility Speed 10 m/s
Mobility Update Interval 0.1 s
Packet size 512 bytes
Packet generation rate 2 packets/s
Simulation time 600 s
7. Simulations752
7.1. Network setup753
We have conducted a series of simulations to evaluate the performance of the754
optimal strategies in D2D networks. Devices have been randomly deployed inside755
a rectangular area of 1000m x 1000m. For each device, the transmission power756
is fixed, and the maximum transmission range is 200m, while two devices can757
directly communicate with each other only if they are in each others transmis-758
sion range. We have performed the simulations using the OMNeT++ network759
simulator and INET framework. We have simulated the IEEE 802.11 MAC layer760
protocol and devices send UDP traffic. In the simulations, the requestor of some761
data is chosen randomly, and the total number of devices of a cluster is set to be762
20. The total simulation time varies (10, 20, 40, 60, 120 seconds) to confirm the763
consistency of results. Table 3 summarizes the simulation parameters.764
7.2. Security controls and malware765
Simulations consider one adversary who is injecting a sequence of consecutive766
malicious replies with the aim to infect Rqs. We assume that the Attacker chooses767
to inject one of [M ] = {Keylogger, SMS spam, Rootkit iSAM, Spyware, iKee-B,768
Premium-Rate calls} malware types (i.e. pure strategies of the Attacker). We769
have also assumed the anti-malware controls, SMS Profiler, iDMA, iTL, and770
Touchstroke, along with their detection rates, as published in [49]. Each mobile771
device is equipped with at least one and up to three anti-malware controls.772
7.3. Attackers773
We have simulated 3 different Attacker types; namely Uniform, Weighted,774
and Nash Attacker:775
• Uniform: the Attacker chooses each malware type from the set with equal776
probability. For example for the set we have used here, there is a probability777
1
6 = 0.1667 the Attacker to choose any of the malware types of [M ];778
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• Weighted : the Attacker chooses a malware type with probability derived779
by the following algorithm:780
1. find the average utility value of the Attacker for each column of the781
game matrix;782
2. add the average utility values of the Attacker for all columns to get783
the combined sum;784
3. for each malware type, derive the probability of a malware type to be785
chosen by dividing its average utility value, found in step 1, by the786
sum derived in step 2.787
• Nash: the Attacker plays according to her Nash strategy µNE .788
Per Reply, the simulator chooses an attack sample from the attack probability789
distribution which is determined by the Attacker profile.790
We have introduced different probability distributions for each Attacker type,791
only for testing purposes. Nevertheless, iRouting is optimal regardless of the792
probability distribution of a malware type to be chosen by the Attacker; a petition793
that is formally consolidated by the mathematical results presented in sections 4794
and 5 as well as the simulation results uncovered in this section.795
7.4. Experiments796
We have considered 5 Cases each referring to different simulation times: 10,797
20, 40, 60, and 120 mins. For each Case we have simulated 1,000 replies, which798
are UDP messages of length 512 bytes with delay limit 100 seconds, for a fixed799
network topology. Yet we refer to the run of the code for the pair 〈Case,#replies〉800
by the term Experiment. We have repeated each Experiment for 10 independent801
network topologies to get a clear idea of the results’ trend. We do that for all 5802
Cases and each type of Attacker profile. Thus we simulate, in total: 5 Cases ×803
1, 000 replies× 10 network topologies = 50, 000 replies.804
7.5. Comparisons805
We compare iRouting against AODV, DSR, and custom-made routing proto-806
col called Proportional Routing (PR), for different Attacker types.807
PR is computed as follows. First, by using the game matrix, the Defender808
computes the average utility value for each row, let it be809
Uˆd(rj) =
∑M
ml=1
Ud(rj ,ml)
M
, ∀ rj ∈ [R]. (29)
Then, the probability of route rj to be chosen equals:810
1− Uˆd(rj)∑R
r=1 Uˆd(r)
. (30)
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According to the results illustrated in Figures 2 - 4, iRouting consistently out-811
performs the rest of the protocols, in terms of both Defender’s expected utility and812
average detection rate, for all different simulation times and Attacker types. The813
results show that iRouting achieves its highest average malware detection rate814
(∼65%) against a Uniform Attacker (non-strategic Attacker), and its worst rate815
against a Weighted Attacker. In the case of a Nash Attacker, iRouting has almost816
22% higher detection rate than PR, 6% than DSR, while it is twice more efficient817
(i.e. ∼11%) than AODV. For a Weighted Attacker, PR behaves differently as it818
achieves approximately 6% lower average detection rate than iRouting, in con-819
trast to DSR and AODV, which perform worse, as opposed to the Nash Attacker820
case, since the difference of their average detection rate compared to iRouting821
becomes double (i.e.∼12% for DSR and 24% for AODV). Finally, for a Uniform822
Attacker, the difference, in terms of detection rate, compared to iRouting, is823
almost the same for both DSR and PR, which is approximately equivalent to824
8%. AODV still has the worst average detection rate among all protocols by825
having 24% worse rate than iRouting.826
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Figure 2: Malware detection rate in presence of a Nash attacker.
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Figure 3: Malware detection rate in presence of a Uniform attacker.
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Figure 4: Malware detection rate in presence of a Weighted attacker.
According to Figures 5 - 7, iRouting achieves the best performance in terms of827
average expected utility among all protocols. More specifically, iRouting improves828
the average expected utility, in the case of a Nash Attacker, by, in average, 49%,829
17%, and 7% compared to PR, AODV, and DSR, respectively. We notice that830
the Defender’s utility in iRouting is similar to the one achieved when DSR is831
used. The reason for this is that DSR improves computational cost as opposed832
to iRouting more than AODV and PR while exhibiting the best detection rate833
among AODV and PR. Average improvement values are slightly more pronounced834
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for a non-strategic Uniform Attacker; 16%, 68%, and 37%, as opposed to the835
same protocols. The situation is similar for a Weighted Attacker, in which case836
the corresponding improvement values are 18%, 53%, and 20%. We also notice837
that the behaviour of all protocols but iRouting is stochastic despite of iRouting838
having steadily the best performance.839
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Figure 5: Utility of the Defender in presence of a Nash attacker.
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Figure 6: Utility of the Defender in presence of a Uniform attacker.
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Figure 7: Utility of the Defender in presence of a Weighted attacker.
8. Conclusion840
In this paper, we have formally investigated how to select an end-to-end path841
to deliver data from a source to a destination in device-to-device networks under842
a game theoretic framework. We assume the presence of an external adversary843
who aims to infect “good” network devices with malware. First, a simple yet844
illuminating two-player security game, between the network (the Defender) and845
an adversary, is studied. To devise optimal routing strategies, optimality analysis846
has been undertaken for different types of games to prove, in theory, that there847
is a Nash equilibrium strategy that always makes the Defender better-off. The848
analysis has shown that the expected security damage that can be inflicted by849
the Attacker is bounded and limited when the proposed strategy is used by the850
Defender. Network simulation results have also illustrated, in practice, that the851
proposed strategy can effectively mitigate malware infection. In future work, we852
intend to investigate machine learning algorithms (e.g. boosting) to convert weak853
learners (e.g. devices with limited number of anti-malware controls) to strong854
ones.855
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